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Constitutionality of Term Limitations:
Can States Limit The Terms of
Members of Congress?
As a result of increasing voter dissatisfaction with incumbent
politicians at all levels of government, voters in a rising number of
states have limited, or are considering limiting, the number of
terms their elected representatives may serve in office.' This
movement to limit terms has affected city, state, and federal elected
officials.2 Consequently, constitutional amendments have been
enacted in several states limiting the number of terms state
legislators may serve. One state has also limited the terms of its
representatives to the United States Congress.4 The current
popularity of term limitation is demonstrated by movements in a
number of states for term limitation, although the voters of at least
1. See Wash. Times, Aug. 23, 1991, Part A, at A4 (listing Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming as states considering term limitation provisions). Other states
which are also considering term limitations provisions are Maine, Montana, and Nevada. 137 CONG.
REC. S6274 (daily ed. May 22, 1991) (statement of Sen. Brown). In addition, there is a new
movement in California, engineered by Proposition 140 author Pete Schabarum, to limit the terms
of California's congressional representatives. 3 New Term-Limit Initiatives Filed, San Francisco
Chron., Nov. 20, 1991, at A19. Three of these states, Michigan, South Dakota, and Wyoming have
term limit proposals which have qualified for their November ballots. Congress Term-Limit Initiative
Supported, San Francisco Chron., Apr. 17, 1992, at A21.
2. See Term-Limitation Measures Go Local" Anti-Incumbency Fever is Spreading, LA.
Times, Mar. 28, 1992, at B7 (discussing the constitutionality of charter cities and counties); Glasser,
Term Limit Drive Makes Comeback, Roll Call, Mar. 12, 1992 (discussing term limitations in
California, Oklahoma, and Colorado); Glasser, Term Limit Drive Scores Easily in Colorado; So Do
5 Incumbents, Roll Call, Nov. 8, 1990 (discussing Colorado's state imposed federal term limitations).
3. See COLO. CONST. art. V, § 3(2); OKLA. CONsT. art. V, § 17A; CAL. CONST. art. IV, §
2(a) (limiting terms of state legislators).
4. See CoLo. CONST. art. XVIII, § 9a(l) (limiting terms of Colorado senators to two
consecutive six-year terms and Colorado representatives to six consecutive two-year terms).
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one state rejected a term limitation amendment to their state
constitution.'
The constitutionality of term limitations on congressional and
state legislators has yet to be argued before the United States
Supreme Court.6 However, the California Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of term limitations for state legislators in
Legislature v. Eu,7 finding that such limitations do not conflict
with either the California or the United States Constitution.! This
Comment will examine the constitutionality of state-enacted term
limits on representatives to the United States Congress.
Part I of this Comment examines the history of term limitations
and looks at the recent attempts by the United States Congress to
limit the number of congressional terms of office.9 Part II surveys
state-enacted term limitations and three state supreme court
decisions pertaining to term limitations on both state and
congressional legislators.1" Part UTI examines the federal
constitutional arguments supporting and opposing state term
5. On November 5, 1991, voters in the state of Washington defeated a term limitation
proposal targeting both state and congressional legislators. Broom & Gilmore, Afraid of Losing Clout,
Voters Reject Term Limits, Seattle Times, Nov. 6, 1991, at Al.
6. On March 9, 1992, the United States Supreme Court denied review of the California
Supreme Court's decision in Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309,286 Cal. Rptr. 283,
cer. denied, 112 S. CL 1292 (1992), which held that a state constitutional amendment limiting the
terms of California state legislators was constitutional under the California and United States
Constitutions. See U.S. Supreme Court Lets Stand California's Term Limits, Business Wire, Inc.,
March 9, 1991 (discussing the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari).
7. 54 Cal. 3d 492, 503, 816 P.2d 1309, 1322, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283, 310 (1991).
8. Id. at 5352 816 P.2d at 1336, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 310. Two other state supreme courts,
Florida and Washington, have examined term limitations on congressional representatives, however,
both courts examined the constitutionality of the proposals under state law only. See Advisory
Opinion to the Attorney General-Limited Political Terms in Certain Elective Offices, ... _Fla......,
592 So. 2d 225 (1991) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion]; League of Women Voters v. Munro, No.
58438-9 (Supreme Court of Wash. 1991) (order granting motion to dismiss). The Florida Supreme
Court issued an advisory opinion to the Attorney General in which the Florida court held that the
Florida term limitation initiative complied with the Florida Constitution. Advisory Opinion 392 So.
2d at 230. The Florida court did not decide the federal constitutional issue. ld at 229. The
Washington Supreme Court also issued an advisory opinion for that state's failed Proposition 553.
League of Women Voters v. Munro, No. 58438-9 (Supreme Court of Wash. 1991) (order granting
molion to dismiss). The court also refused to consider the federal constitutional issues, citing a lack
of time to do so. Id. at 2.
9. See infra notes 13-56 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 57-146 and accompanying text.
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limitations on congressional legislators. 1 Part IV concludes by
suggesting that a constitutional amendment is the best way to
impose term limitations on members of Congress."
I. INTRODUCTON TO TERM LIMiTATION
Term limitations are not a new concept. The delegates to the
unicameral legislature created by the Articles of Confederation
were appointed by the legislatures of their respective states and
could be recalled by their state legislature at any time.13 Delegates
under the Articles of Confederation, who were appointed annually,
were limited to serving three years out of every six-year period. 4
In 1784, Congress conducted an investigation to ascertain
whether any of the appointed delegates had stayed beyond their
appointed term." This investigation revealed that one delegate
from Massachusetts, Samuel Osgood, had overstayed his term.
16
Under protest, Osgood resigned from office. 17  The same
investigation also revealed that the Rhode Island delegates had
remained beyond their three year limit. 8 When these holdover
delegates were confronted, their protests led to a bitter debate about
11. See infra notes 147-289 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 290-302 and accompanying text.
13. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, LIMITING PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL TERMS,
5 (1979) [hereinafter LIMITING TERMs]. See generally SuLA P. RICHARDSON, CONGRESSIONAL
TENURE. A REVIEW OF EFFORTS To LIMIT HOUSE AND SENATE SERVICE 3 (1989) [hereinafter
CONGRESSIONAL TENURE] (noting that the fourth and fifth resolutions of the Virginia Plan
contemplated that members of the United States House of Representatives and Senate could not be
reelected after completing their terms).
14. ART. OF CONFED. art. V, cL. 2. See CONGRESSIONAL TENURE, supra note 13, at 2 (stating
that delegates under the Articles of Confederation had limited terms). See also Joint Resolutions
Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States with Respect to the Number of
Terms of Office Which Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives May Serve: Hearings
on S.. Res. 27 and S.i. Res. 28 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3 (1978) (stating that delegates under the Articles of Confederation were
limited to serving three years out of every six-year period).
15. LIMInNG TERMS, supra note 13, at 5.
16. Id
17. Id. Osgood stated that he was "'inexpressibly disgusted" with public life. Id
18. Id.
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whether these delegates should leave.19 The matter was eventually
dropped when Congress realized that legislative business would
practically stop if the Rhode Island delegates were ousted, and,
therefore, the Rhode Island delegates were permitted to remain in
Congress.2"
At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, most of the signers
of the Constitution had served as state delegates under the Articles
of Confederation.21 The delegates to the Constitutional Convention
passionately debated the length of terms for members of the House
of Representatives, but limitations on the number of terms were not
discussed.' After debating the merits of one, two, and three-year
terms, the delegates finally compromised on two-year terms for
members of the House of Representatives.' Terms of office for
United States Senators were also debated, but mostly regarding the
length of the term, rather than any limitation on the number of
19. Id. at 6. This situation prompted James Madison to comment that it was the most
"indecent conduct" he had seen in any assembly. Id. See CONGRESSIoNAL TENURF, supra note 13,
at 3 n.7, (stating that there is confusion among sources whether the members were asked to leave
because of having served beyond their three year term, or for staying beyond the year for which they
had been most recently elected).
20. LiMRrTNo TERMs, supra note 13, at 6.
21. Id. Thirty-two of the thirty-nine signers of the constitution had served as delegates under
the Continental Congress. Id. Several others who were present, but did not sign the constitution, had
also served as delegates. Id.
22. Id. The convention also debated whether the members of Congress should be ineligible
for office under the national government for a number of years after serving in Congress. Id. This
provision was not adopted into the constitution. Id. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (setting out the
qualifications for the House of Representatives); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3. (setting out the qualifications
for members of the Senate). Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 3 (setting out the incompatibility clause
which provides that during the time for which a member of congress is in office, that member cannot
be appointed to any civil office of the United States, nor may any person who holds any United
States office be a member of congress during the term of his United States office). See also 2 J.
MADISON, DEBAirs OF THE FEDERAL CONSTrtUmON op 1787, at 183-87 (J. Elliot ed., 1845)
[hereinafter DEBATES] (discussing the different plans for congressional terms in office).
23. DEBATEs, supra note 22, at 224. This compromise was introduced by the Virginia
delegate, Edmond Randolph, on June 21, 1787. Id. Delegates against the three year plan thought that
three years was too long in office. Id. at 225. Madison thought that three years would add stability
to the new republic. LITNG TERMs, supra note 13, at 6. See Four Year U.S. House of
Representative Terms, 1979: Hearings on S.J. Res. 34 Before the Subcomra. on the Constitution of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1979) [hereinafter Hearings on Four
Year Terms] (statement of Catharine Trauernicht, Diretor of Research, Foundation for the Study of
Presidential and Congressional Terms) (noting that the two-year term was the result of compromise
among the delegates to the Constitutional Convention).
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terms.24 James Madison and Alexander Hamilton thought that
senators should serve long terms of office, while other delegates
regarded frequent elections as a method to ensure good
behavior' The length of terms suggested for senators ranged
from four years to life.26 A compromise was reached among the
delegates when they agreed to six-year terms with elections every
two years.27
Until 1900, most members of the House of Representatives did
not make a career of their service in the House, but instead retired
after a few terms in office.28 At each election, new representatives
were elected thirty to sixty percent of the time.29 Accordingly,
limiting the number of terms of members of Congress was not an
issue.3" Most proposals to limit congressional terms have come
since congressional service has become a career." From 1787 to
the present, a number of proposals altering congressional terms of
24. LMrrmINo TERMS, supra note 13, at 7. The delegates generally accepted longer terms for
senators than for representatives. IU. But see supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the
fact that the delegates did contemplate periods of ineligibility for other federal office).
25. LIMGITIN TERMS, supra note 13, at 6-7. Delegates who supported one-year terms thought
that a one-year term would ensure against tyranny by elected officials. Idat 6. Supporters of a three-
year term thought that a longer term would add stability to the new republic. Id.
26. id. at 6.
27. Id. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (stating the duration of the term of United States
Senators).
28. Petracca, Initiative 553-Yes:--Should Lawmaker's Terms be Limited?, Seattle Times, Oct.
6, 1991, at A15. See LAmNo TERms, supra note 13, at 8 (discussing trends in House tenure,
including the shift in the early 1900's to service in the House as a career); Hearings on Four Year
Terms, supra note 23, at 43 (testimony of Congressman Elwood H. Hillis) (stating that in the 1800's,
members self-imposed a limit of four years of service in the House and six years in the Senate);
Congressional Tenure: Hearings on S.J Res. 27 and S.1, Res. 28 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4 (1978) (statement of
Senator Dennis DeConcini) [hereinafter Hearings on Congressional Tenure] (stating that a significant
trend of the 20th-century is the tendency of members of Congress to serve "longer and longer
terms"); 137 CONG. REC. S6273 (daily ed. May 22, 1991) (statement of Senator Brown) (stating that
typical members of Congress serve more than twice as long today as members of Congress a century
ago).
29. Price, H. Douglas, The Congressional Career - Then and Now, in CONG. BEHAVIOR 16
(1971).
30. LzM No TERMS, supra note 13, at 9. See infra note 35 and accompanying text (detailing
attempts to limit terms of members of Congress at the turn of the twentieth century).
31. LmuitrNG TERMS, supra note 13, at 9.
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office have been suggested by Congress32  and various
presidents.33 However, these proposals have not fared well.
Term limitations were suggested as early as 1789, in the First
Congress.34 Congress' next attempt to limit terms of both houses
did not come until 1947,35 the year in which the United States
Senate considered the twenty-second amendment to the United
States Constitution. 36 The twenty-second amendment limited the
president to two consecutive terms of office,37 so it is not
surprising that Congress considered limiting its own terms at that
time. During the debate on the twenty-second amendment, former
Senator O'Daniel (D-Tx) secured only one vote when he proposed
limiting all elected officials to one six-year term of office.38 From
1975 to the present, several term limitation proposals have been
introduced during each session of Congress.39 Hearings were held
32. See infra notes 34-56 and accompanying text (discussing attempts by Congress to limit
congressional terms of office).
33. Limiting Terms, supra note 13, at 8. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Johnson
proposed lengthening the term of membership in the House of Representatives to four years. Id See
also CONGRESSIONAL TENURE, supra note 13, at 8 (stating that Presidents Lincoln, Truman,
Eisenhower, and Kennedy as well as Vice President Quayle supported term limitations for members
of Congress); Hearings on Congressional Tenure, supra note 28, at 105 (statement of John C.
Gartland, member of the Foundation for the Study of Presidential and Congressional Terms) (stating
that Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy indicated support for term limits).
34. CONOREsSIONAL TemR, supra note 13, at 4. Rep. Thomas Tucker of South Carolina
introduced two proposals, one to limit the terms of the House and one to limit terms of the Senate.
Id. These proposals were never voted on by the House. Ud See 137 CoNe. REC. S6274 (daily ed.
May 22, 1991) (statement of Senator Brown) (stating that a limit on congressional terms was
proposed duting the First Congress in 1789).
35. See CONGRESSIONAL TENuRF, supra note 13, at 4 n.12 (concluding that term limitation
proposals for the House were made in 1896, 1904, and 1906, but that none were made for the
Senate).
36. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1 (limiting the President to two four-year terms in
office).
37. Id
38. 93 CONG. REc. 1963 (1947). Senator O'Daniel's proposal would have limited the terms
of the president, vice president, and both houses of Congress. l The vote was 83 to 1 against the
proposal. Il See CONGESSIONAL TENURE, supra note 13, at 5 (discussing Senator O'Daniel's
proposal).
39. See CONGRESSiONAL TENURo , supra note 13, at 7 (providing a table which states the
number of proposals as follows: 94th Congress (1975-76), 8 proposals; 95th Congress (1977-78), 12
proposals; 96th Congress (1979-80), 10 proposals; 97th Congress (1981-82), 11 proposals; 98th
Congress (1983-84), 10 proposals; 99th Congress (1985-86), 6 proposals; 100th Congress (1987-88),
5 proposals; 101st Congress (1989-90), 7 proposals). See infra notes 42-56 (providing information
for the 102nd Congress).
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before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary in March, 1978, specifically on the
issue of limiting legislative terms of office.' The next year, while
hearings were being held on a bill to extend the term of office in
the House of Representatives, two witnesses suggested term
limitations in their testimony.41
In the first session of the 102nd Congress, in 1991, Senator
Brown (R-Co) proposed senatorial term limitations as an
amendment to Senate Bill 3 concerning campaign finance
reform.42 The proposed amendment applied only to those senators
receiving public campaign financing, aid limited those senators to
two consecutive six-year terms.43 However, Senator Brown's
amendment was soundly defeated by a vote of 68 to 30 to table the
amendment.' The amendment was tabled in part because the
senators wished to focus on the issue of campaign finance reform,
and not term limitation.4 5 Another reason for the failure of this
amendment may have been that it imposed term limitations on only
those candidates who accepted public funds.'
Also during the 102nd Congress, several constitutional
amendments focusing solely on term limitation were introduced in
both the House and the Senate.47 Of these, the proposals with the
40. Hearings on Congressional Tenure, supra note 28, at 1-184 (1978).
41. Hearings on Four-Year Term, supra note 23, at 39-40 (statements of Congressmen Elwood
H. Hillis and J. Danforth Quayle).
42. See S.B. 3, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CoNG. REc. S6272 (1991) (proposing term
limitations on senators as part of an amendment to a campaign finance bill).
43. 1d
44. 137 CONG. REc. S6282. See Moss, Senate Votes Against Move to Limit Number of Terms,
Wash. Times, May 23, 1991, Part A, at Al (discussing the vote to table Senator Brown's proposed
amendment).
45. Id at S6277. Senator Bumpers (D-Ark) stated that while term limits are a manifestation
of discontent with the system, that discontent is aimed in the wrong direction and should instead be
aimed at the way campaigns are conducted. Ica
46. 1&
47. Seven joint resolutions were proposed in the House and one in the Senate. See H.RJ. Res.
21, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. H61 (1991) (introducing staggered four-year terms for
the House with a three term limit on the four-year term; a four term limit if the House term remains
at two years and a senatorial term limit of two terms); H.RJ. Res. 22, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., 137
CoN?. REc. H61 (1991) (introducing a limit of six terms on the House and two terms on the Senate);
H.RJ. Res. 42, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CoNo. REC. E199 (1991) (introducing a three term limit
on the House and a one term limit on the Senate); H.RJ. Res. 54, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG.
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most sponsors are House Joint Resolutions (HJR) 21 and 22.48
HJR 21 advocates changing the length of the term of office in the
House from two to four years.49 However, it does not affect the
length of the term in the Senate.5" If the four-year term is
adopted, HJR 21 proposes a three term limitation.51 If the term of
office remains at two years, HIR 21 advocates a four term
limitation.52 By comparison, HJR 22 does not propose to change
the length of the terms of the members of the House or Senate. 3
Instead, HJR 22 is solely a proposal to limit the number of terms
a legislator may serve.54 HJR 22 limits senators to two terms of
office and members of the House to six terms of office. 55 Neither
HJR 21 nor HJR 22 has been voted on.56
II. CURRENT TERM LIMITAT[ONS ON STATE LEGISLATORS
Thus far, the voters of three states, Oklahoma, California and
Colorado, have amended their state constitutions to provide for
REC. E15 (1991) (introducing staggered four-year terms for the House with a three time limit on the
four-year term; a four term limit if the House term remains at two years; and no senatorial limit);
H.R.J. Res. 93, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CoNe. REC. H712 (1991) (introducing a limit of six
consecutive terms on the House and two consecutive terms on the Senate); H.RJ. Res. 99, 102nd
Cong., Ist Sess., 137 CONG.REc. H825 (1991) (introducing a limit of six consecutive terms on the
House and two consecutive terms onthe Senate); H.R.J. Res. 112,102nd Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG.
REc. E431 (1991) (introducing a four-year term on the House with a three term limit and a two term
limit on the Senate); S.J. Res. 121, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CoNe. REc. S440 (1991) (introducing
a two term limit on the Senate with a limit of 14 years of service and a six term limit on the House,
with a limit of 12 years of service).
48. See Bill Tracking Report, 1991 HJ. Res. 21 (1992) (LEXIS, Legis library, Bltrck file)
(stating that HJ. Res. 21 has twenty-one co-sponsors) ; Bill Tracking Repol, 1991 H.J. Res. 22
(1992) (LEXIS, Legis library, Bltrck file) (stating that HJ. Res. 22 has twenty-seven co-sponsors).
49. H.RJ. Res. 21, 102nd Cong., Ist Sess., 137 CONG.REc. H61 (1991).
50. Id.
51. Bill Tracking Report, 1991 H.J. Res. 22 (1992) (LEXIS, Legis library, Bltrck file).
52. Id.
53. H.R.J. Res. 22, 102nd Cong., 1st Sees., 137 CONo.REc. H60 (1991).
54. Id
55. Bill Tracking Report, 1991 HJ. Res. 22 (1992) (LEXIS, Legis library, Bltrck file).
56. Joint Resolutions 21 and 22 stalled in the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on
Civil and Constitutional Rights. Cong. Legis. Status Report, Status Profile for H.RJ. Res. 21 and 22,
102d Cong., 2nd Sess. (June 4, 1992) (prepared by Rep. McCollum (R-17)). On May 14, 1992, Rep.
Bill McCollum (R-Fl) filed a Motion to Discharge Committee for both resolutions. let At the time
of the publication deadline for this edition of the Pacific LawJournal, the Motions to Discharge were
still pending.
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limitation on the number of terms of their state legislators.57
However, term limit proposals have not been universally
accepted." Even so, the term limitation movement is growing in
many states.59 For example, on November 3, 1992, voters in
Florida will vote on whether to impose term limitations on their
state and congressional legislators.'
Although the term limitation concept is spreading, the terms of
each proposal vary, which may indicate why some term limitation
proposals have been successful, and others have not.61 Cases have
been brought before the state supreme courts of California,
Washington, and Florida to determine the constitutionality of term
limitations under both the state and federal constitutions.
62
57. See OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 17A (limiting members of the state legislature to twelve years
in the legislature); CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 2(a) (limiting state senators to two four-year terms and
state assembly members to three two-year terms); CoLo. CONST. art. V, § 3(2) (limiting state senators
to two consecutive four-year terms and state representatives to four consecutive two-year terms). See
also S. Glasser, Term-Limit Initiative Scores Easily in Colorado; So Do 5 Incumbents, Roll Call,
Nov. 8, 1990 (discussing the passage and provisions of the Colorado amendment); Jacobs, Cahfornia
Elections Propositions 131, 140; Oklahoma Voters Send Signal on Limiting Terms, L.A. Times, Sept.
20, 1990, part A, at 41, col. 1 (discussing the Oklahoma and California amendments); Schreiner,
Term-Limiting Prop. 140 Looks Like a Winner Prop. 131 Campaign Finance Plan Losing, San
Francisco Chron., Nov. 7, 1990, at Al (discussing the provisions of Proposition 140).
58. In November of 1991, the voters of Washington state rejected a term limitation proposal
which would have restricted the terms of both state legislators and state representatives in Congress.
Afraid ofLosing Clou4 Voters Reject Term Limits, Seattle Times, Nov. 6, 1991, at Al (stating that
initiative measure 553 was narrowly defeated on Nov. 5, 1991). See Ballot Measures at a Glance,
Seattle Times, Oct. 4, 1991, at A3 (stating the terms of initiative 553 and the groups who supported
and opposed initiative 553).
59. See supra note 1 (discussing states considering term limitation).
60. Glasser, Fla. Court Rejects Brief of House Counse4 OKs Term-Limit Initiative for Nov.
3 Ballot, Roll Call, Jan. 6, 1992. Florida's initiative proposes a lifetime ban from a particular office
once an individual has served the maximum number of terms in office. CONS'rTuTONAL
AMENDmENT PETTION FoRM, Limited Political Terms in Certain Elective Offices, April 3, 1991.
61. Compare COLO. CoNsT. art. XVIl, § 9a(1) (limiting members of Congress prospectively
to no more than six consecutive terms with a four-year break before that person can run for the
House or Senate again) with 1991 Washington Initiative 553, SECRETARY OF STATE, VOTERS
PAMPHLET, WASHINGTON STATE GENERAL ELECTION at 24 (Nov. 5, 1991) [hereinafter VOTERS
PAMPHLEr] (limiting members of the United States House of Representatives retrospectively to three
consecutive terms, and members of the United States Senate to no more than two consecutive terms,
with a six-year break before that member can run for the House or Senate again).
62. See Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492,535,816 P.2d 1309,1336,286 Cal. Rptr. 283, 310
(1991) (holding that term limitations on state legislators did not violate the California or the federal
constitution); League of Women Voters v. Munro, No. 58438-9 (Supreme Court of Wash. 1991)
(order granting motion to dismiss) (dismissing complaint which alleged that Washington's term
limitation initiative violated the Washington constitution as well as the federal constitution); Advisory
1685
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However, none of these courts considered the issue of whether a
state constitutional amendment can limit the terms of members of
Congress.63 The term limitations enacted in Oklahoma and
Colorado have not been challenged in court.
Oklahoma was the first state to impose term limitations on its
state legislators." Under the Oklahoma amendment, state
legislators are limited to six two-year terms, or a total of twelve
years in office.' The twelve-year limitation includes service in
either house of the state legislature,' and imposes a limitation on
total years in office, not just consecutive years.67 The Oklahoma
amendment is prospective in application, in that legislators who
were in office at the time the amendment passed may serve another
twelve years in office.'
On November 6, 1990, California became the second state to
impose term limitations when California voters passed Proposition
140, also known as "The Political Reform Act of 1990."69 This
Act imposed limitations on legislative terms, budgets, and
pensions.7" Under Proposition 140, California's term limitations
apply to state legislators and other specified state officeholders, but
Opinion supra note 8 at 229 (holding that Florida's term limitation initiative did not violate the
Florida Constitution).
63. See League of Women Voters, No. 58438-9 at 2 (Supreme Court of Wash. 1991) (order
granting motion to dismiss) (dismissing challenge of Washington's term limitation initiative without
consideration of federal constitutional arguments); Advisory Opinion, supra note 8 at 229 (validating
Florida's term limitation initiative on state constitutional grounds only).
64. See OKL.A. CONST. art. V, § 17A (stating that these sections were adopted at a special




68. See id The statute states that the effective date of the amendment is after Sept. 18, 1990.
Id.
69. See Note, Proposition 140: The Constitutionality of Term Limits, 22 PAc. LJ. 1038
(discussing the provisions of Proposition 140).
70. See CAL. CONSr. art. IV, § 2(a) (enacted by Proposition 140) (limiting terms of state
senators and assembly members); id. art. IV, § 4.5 (enacted by Proposition 140) (requiring legislators
to participate in the federal Social Security system); id. art. IV, § 7.5 (enacted by Proposition 140)
(limiting legislative expenditures). See also Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492,501-03,816 P.2d 1309,
1313-14, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283, 287-88 (1991) (summarizing the legislative term, budget, and pension
limits of Proposition 140).
1686
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not to California's representatives in the United States Congress.71
Proposition 140 limits state assembly members to three two-year
terms, while state senators are limited to two four-year terms.72 As
interpreted by the California Supreme Court, the limits under
Proposition 140 constitute a lifetime ban from a particular office,
once an officeholder has served the specified number of terms in
that office.73 The limitations apply to all state legislators elected
on or after November 6, 1990.'4 Additionally, state senators not
included on the November 1990 ballot may serve only one more
term.75 Therefore, unlike Colorado's term limitations which apply
only prospectively,76 the California provisions have a retrospective
aspect."
Shortly after the passage of Proposition 140 in November 1990,
a challenge to its provisions, Legislature v. Eu,78 was filed with
the California Supreme Court, which held that term limtiations on
state legislators satisfy both the California and the United States
Constitution.79 The petitioners in Eu consisted of the California
71. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 2(a) (enacted by Proposition 140) (state senators and assembly
members); id. art. V, § 11 (enacted by Proposition 140) (lieutenant governor, attorney general,
controller, secretary of state, and treasurer); k art. IX, § 2 (enacted by Proposition 140)
(superintendent of public instruction); id. art. XIII, § 17 (enacted by Proposition 140) (members of
board of equalization). On November 5, 1991, Pete Schabarum, the author of Proposition 140,
announced a plan to similarly limit the terms of California's members of Congress. Schabarum to
Seek Term Limits for California Congressional Delegation, L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 1991, Part A, col.
4. at 3.
72. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 2(a) (enacted by Proposition 140).
73. Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d. 492, 506, 816 P.2d 1309, 1316, 286 Cal. Rptr 283, 290
(1991).
74. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 7 (enacted by Proposition 140).
75. Id
76. See infra notes 117-118 and accompanying text (discussing the prospective application
of Colorado's term limitation amendment).
77. See CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 7 (enacted by Proposition 140) (stating that term limitations
apply to persons who are elected after Nov. 6, 1990, except that incumbent Senators who are not on
the ballot may serve only one additional term).
78. 54 Cal. 3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309,286 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1991), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 1293
(1992).
79. Id. at 535,816 P.2d at 1336,286 Cal. Rptr. at 310. In granting the California Legislature's
petition for mandate, the California Supreme Court thought that this suit should be promptly resolved,
because of the significant issues involved. Id. at 500, 816 P.2d at 1312, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
Usually, cases go to the supreme court only after review by lower courts. Id A petition for mandate
allows the litigants to take their case directly to the supreme court. Id
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Legislature, various individual legislators, taxpayers, voters, and
citizens." Respondents were the state officials charged with
implementation, enforcement, and application of the constitutional
amendment."1 The sponsors of Proposition 140, Californians for
a Citizen Government, intervened in the action on the side of the
respondents. 2 The Eu petitioners advanced several arguments
challenging the interpretation and constitutionality of Proposition
140. 3 In its discussion, the California Supreme Court expressly
stated that it would approach the constitutional analysis of
Proposition 140 as the court understood the United States Supreme
Court would approach it."
In the first step of its analysis, and as a preliminary matter, the
California Supreme Court considered whether the term limitations
enacted by Proposition 140 constituted a lifetime ban from a
particular office, or a ban on consecutive terms in office. 5 After
reviewing the ballot pamphlet and the arguments of the proponents
of Proposition 140, the California Supreme Court determined that
the intent of Proposition 140 was to impose a lifetime ban from a
particular office after the specified number of terms had been
80. Id at 500, 841 P.2d at 1312, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
81. Id
82. Id at 500, 816 P.2d at 1312,286 Cal. Rptr. at 286. The court refers to both intervener and
respondents as "'respondents." Id.
83. Id at 503-35, 816 P.2d at 1314-36, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 288-04. The frst two arguments
offered by the petitioners were based upon the California Constitution. Id. at 506-14, 816 P.2d at
1316-22, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 290-96. Petitioners first argued that Proposition 140 has such
comprehensive consequences on the constitutional scheme that it represents a constitutional revision
rather than a constitutional amendment. Id. at 506, 816 P.2d 1316, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 290. Next,
petitioners argued that Proposition 140 embraced more than one subject and, therefore, violated
California" single-subject rule. Id at 512, 816 P.2d at 1320,286 Cal. Rptr. at 294. Neither argument
succeeded. Id. at 506, 816 P.2d at 1322, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 296. See generally Note, Proposition 140:
The Constitutionality of Term Limitadons, 22 PAC. LJ. 1041-48 (discussing the standards California
courts use in evaluating single-subject and constitutional revision arguments).
84. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 515,816 P.2d at 1322,286 Cal. Rptr. at 296 (1991). On March 9, 1992,
the United States Supreme Court denied review of the California Supreme Court's ruling in
Legislature v. Eu. Id., 54 Cal. 3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309,286 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1991), cert. denied, 112
S. CL 1292 (1992).
85. Id at 503, 816 P.2d at 1314, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
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served.86 In reaching this conclusion, the Eu court noted that the
initiative was designed to eliminate people who made a career out
of service in the legislature.8 7 This intent was determined from the
fact that the ballot pamphlet did not make any reference to
consecutive limitation, but stated the fact that the measure was
intended as a lifetime ban.88 The Eu court recognized that ballot
pamphlets sometimes overstate arguments, but thought the fact that
the proponents of the measure did not contradict the lifetime ban
argument was significant in determining the intent of the
measure.
8 9
After determining that Proposition 140 did not violate the
California constitution, the California Supreme Court turned to the
federal constitutional arguments." Specifically, the Eu court
examined the petitioner's argument that the lifetime ban
contemplated by the term limitations interfered with the voting
rights of the populace, and the candidacy rights of present and
future candidates, and, therefore, violated the first and fourteenth
amendments of the United States Constitution.91 In particular,
plaintiffs alleged because the lifetime ban imposed by term
limitations forever barred office holders from running for the same
office again, term limitations were a substantial burden on the right
to vote and the right of candidacy.' In considering this argument,
the California Supreme Court first examined the question of what
standard of review should be applied to test the constitutional
validity of Proposition 140's term limitations." The petitioners
argued that a "compelling interest" standard was mandated by the
alleged burdens Proposition 140 placed upon voting and candidacy
86. It at 500, 816 P.2d at 1316, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 290. Respondent Eu, arguing for the
validity of Proposition 140, argued that the measure was intended as a limit on consecutive terms.
Id at 503, 816 P.2d at 1314, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 288. Petitioners contended that Proposition 140
imposed a lifetime ban. Id
87. Id at 505, 816 P.2d at 1315, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
88. Id. at 505, 816 P.2d at 1315,286 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
89. Id. at 505, 816 P.2d at 1316, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
90. Id at 514,816 P.2d at 1322,286 Cal. Rptr. at 296. See supra note 83 and accompanying
text (discussing the single-subject and constitutional revision arguments).
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rights, which petitioners termed to be "fundamental. ' 9 4 In
formulating their theory, the petitioners relied upon Eu v. San
Francisco Democratic Committee, in which California's ban on
primary endorsements by political parties was struck down.96 The
Eu court rejected this standard, noting that Proposition 140 has no
effect on speech interests, and has an equal impact on all political
parties.97 The California Supreme Court noted that the ban in San
Francisco Democratic Committee burdened free speech and
association, and, therefore, had to satisfy a compelling interest
standard of review.9" However, the Eu court concluded that San
Francisco Democratic Committee did not apply in the term
limitation context since Proposition 140 affected all parties equally
and did not implicate speech interests."
After noting that the United States Supreme Court has given the
states wide latitude in making election laws, as long as the laws are
applied evenhandedly without discriminating against particular
citizens,'te the California Supreme Court stated that the term
limitations of Proposition 140 met that standard of review.'"
Following the United States Supreme Court's determination that
challenges to election laws cannot be resolved by a "litmus-paper
test"' 2 the California Supreme Court applied a balancing test
from Anderson v. Celebreeze.'03 Essentially, the Anderson test
requires a court to weigh the injury alleged by the plaintiff against
94. Id Under petitioner's analysis, no compelling state interest could support a lifetime ban
from office. Id See infra notes 212-251 and accompanying text (discussing the standard of review
under equal protection for elections cases).
95. 489 U.S. 214 (1989) (striking down California's statutory ban on political party
endorsements of primary candidates, finding a violation of the first amendment). See generally,
Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single Member Office and the Voting Rights Act, 77 VA. L. REV.
1, 21 (1991) (discussing the California statute which required rotation of party chairman from
Northern to Southern California which was struck down in San Francisco Democratic Committee).
96. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 515, 816 P.2d at 1322,286 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
97. Id at 515, 816 P.2d at 1322, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 516, 816 P.2d at 1323, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 297 (citing Rodriguez v. Popular
Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1 (1982)).
101. Id
102. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
103. Eu. at 516, 816 P.2d at 1323, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
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the protected interest asserted by the state."' The argument that
Proposition 140 infringed on the equal protection rights of voters
or candidates was rejected, as the Eu court found that any injury to
the voters and candidates was outweighed, under the Anderson test,
by the state's interest in reforming the system of incumbency.
10 5
The petitioners also alleged that Proposition 140 was an unlawful
bill of attainder'06  enacted to punish longtime incumbent
legislators. 7 The Eu petitioners pointed to portions of the ballot
pamphlet arguments which referred to certain legislators by
name.0 8 The California court disagreed that these mentions
qualified Proposition 140 as a bill of attainder, finding that none of
the three tests set forth in Nixon v. Administrator of General
Services"9 was met by the term limitation provisions.'
Since the equal protection issues apply to members of Congress
as well as to state legislators, the California Supreme Court's
104. Id. at 516-17, 816 P.2d at 1323, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 297 (quoting Anderson 480 U.S. at 789-
90). See infra note 259 and accompanying text (stating the Anderson test). The Anderson Court also
required a reviewing court to consider any less drastic alternatives to a lifetime ban. Anderson, 480
U.S. at 806.
105. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 524, 816 P.2d at 1328, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 302. The Eu court weighed
several facts in its Anderson analysis, including the fact that an incumbent is not barred from any
other office, term limitations apply only after numerous years of service in office, and for most of
those affected, the term limitations are prospective in effect Id. at 518, 816 P.2d at 1324, 286 Cal.
Rptr. at 298. As to the rights of voters, the court noted the fact that voters could still vote for
qualified candidates. Id, at 519, 816 P.2d at 1325, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
106. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10 (prohibiting state enactment of a bill of attainder). A bill of
attainder is a legislative act that applies to named individuals, or to easily ascertainable members of
a group, in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial. BLACK'S LAW
DICnTONrARY 150 (5th ed. 1979)..
107. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 525, 816 P.2d at 1329, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
108. Id. at 525-26, 816 P.2d at 1329,286 Cal. Rptr. at 303. The pamphlet specifically referred
to Assemblyman Willie Brown and Senator David Robert; each of whom has been in office more
than fifteen years. Id.
109. 433 U.S. 425 (1977). In Nixon, former President Richard Nixon alleged that the
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, which directed the Administrator of General
Services to take custody of President Nixon's papers and tapes, violated the constitution as a bill of
attainder. Id. at 428.
110. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 527, 816 P.2d at 1330, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 303-304. The Nixon tests
included a historical test, which looked at whether the challenged provision had been typically
prohibited by the Constitution; a functional test of the actual existence of punishment, which looked
at whether the challenged law could reasonably be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes;
and a motivational test which examined whether a congressional intent to punish was present in the
legislative history of the law. Id. at 526-27, 816 P.2d at 1329-30, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
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analysis in Eu is helpful in determining whether term limitations on
members of Congress, such as those enacted by Colorado, are
valid.11 Unlike the California term limitations litigated in Eu, the
Colorado provisions have not been challenged. Colorado's term
limitations became effective after those of California and
Oklahoma.112 Colorado's term limitation amendment is the most
comprehensive to date, as it imposes term limitations on Colorado's
state legislators, as well as the state's congressional
representatives."' The Colorado limitations on state legislators
differ from those of Oklahoma and California in several
respects." 4 The Colorado provision limits state senators to two
consecutive four-year terms, and state representatives to four
consecutive two-year terms. 15 As defined by the Colorado
provisions, terms are consecutive unless they are separated by a
hiatus of four or more years.' 16 Therefore, to escape the term
limitation provision, a legislator could run every other four years
indefinitely. Additionally, the Colorado amendment is purely
prospective in nature." 7 Since the amendment provides that the
limitations apply only to those state legislators elected on or after
January 1, 1991, all state legislators elected on that date, whether
incumbent or newly-elected, face the same term limitations.1 8
111. See infra notes 119-122 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations on members
of Congress enacted in Colorado).
112. Compare CoLO. CoNsT. art. V, § 3(2) (enacted Nov. 6, 1990 and effective on
proclamation of governor Jan. 3, 1991) with OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 17A (enacted Sept. 18, 1990
and immediately effective) and CAL. CONST. art IV, § 2(a) (enacted Nov. 6, 1990 immediately
effective)
113. See CoLO. CONST. art. IV, § 1(2) (limiting the terms of governor, lieutenant governor,
secretary of state, state treasurer and attorney general); id. art. V, § 3(2) (limiting the terms of state
senators and representatives); id. art. XVIII, § 9a(l) (limiting the terms of congressional
representatives).
114. Compare CoLO. CoNsT. art. V, § 3(2) (limiting the terms of state senators and
representatives) with OKLA. CONsT. art. V, § 17A (limiting terms of state legislators) and CAL.
CONST. art IV, § 2(a) (limiting terms of state senators and assembly members). See infra notes 115-
118 and accompanying text (discussing limits on state congressional representatives).
115. CoLo. CoNsr. art. V, § 3(2). Colorado's term limitation amendment also imposes
limitations on other elected state offices. See id. art. IV, § 1(2) (stating that the governor, lieutenant
governor, secretary of state, state treasurer, and attorney general are limited to two four-year terms).
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Colorado is the only state to limit the terms of office of its
representatives in the United States Congress.119 The Colorado
congressional representatives, both Senators and members of the
House of Representatives, are limited to twelve consecutive years
of service in Congress.' As these provisions are purely
prospective in nature, even if an executive or state representative
has served for many years, that individual may continue to serve
as a congressional representative. Other than the inclusion of
Colorado's congressional representatives in the term limitation
provisions, the significant difference between the Colorado term
limitation provisions and those of California and Oklahoma is that
Colorado's scheme provides for limitations on consecutive terms,
rather than lifetime term limitations on its officeholders and
legislators.121 This allows a Colorado incumbent, who has
previously served the prescribed number of consecutive terms, to
run for the same office if there is a four year hiatus between
terms.122
The Colorado provisions have not yet been challenged in court.
This may be because Colorado's provisions were passed by an
overwhelming majority of the voters."3 A further reason for the
absence of a legal challenge is that no legislators will be affected
119. See i. art. XVIII, § 9a(1) (limiting the terms of members of Congress).
120. 1, As with the terms of state legislators, terms are consecutive unless they are four years
apart. Id.
121. See id. (limiting Colorado's United States senators to two consecutive six-year terms and
members of the House of Representatives to six consecutive two-year terms). California's provisions
constitute a lifetime ban on its legislators. Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 506, 816 P.2d 1309,
1316, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283,290 (1991). Oklahoma provides that anyone elected after the effective date
of the amendment can serve no more than twelve years in the Oklahoma Legislature. OKLA. CONST.
art. V, § 17A. The Oklahoma amendment further provides that years do not have to be consecutive
to qualify for the twelve year limit. Id See also Jacobs, California Elections Propositions 131, 140;
Oklahoma Voters Send Signal on Limiting Terms, L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 1990, Part A, at 41, col. 1
(characterizing the Oklahoma amendment as a lifetime ban).
122. See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII §9a(1) (limiting Colorado's United States senators to two
consecutive six-year terms and members of the House of Representatives to six consecutive two-year
terms).
123. Taylor & Schwartz, Democrats Win Florida, Texas Statehouse Prizes; Helms, Most Other
Hill Incumbents Prevai, Washington Post, Nov. 7, 1990, at Al. Over 70% of voters approved the
term limitation measures. Id
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until after the year 2000, since the term limitations apply
prospectively only.124
Following the successful passage of term limitation proposals
in Oklahoma, California and Colorado, voters in other states will
soon be considering their own term limit proposals. 2 In
November 1992, Florida voters will vote on a proposal limiting the
terms of their state and congressional legislators to eight
consecutive years. 26  This proposed amendment, like the
Colorado amendment, is purely prospective in nature.'"
However, the eight-year consecutive term limitation mandated by
the Florida proposal is considerably shorter than the twelve-year
consecutive term limitation imposed by the comparable Colorado
provision."
The constitutionality of Florida's proposed term limitation
amendment was brought before the Florida Supreme Court in a
petition by the Florida State Attorney General requesting an
advisory opinion from the court.t 29 In its limited decision, the
Florida court held only that the term limitations complied with the
Florida Constitution's single-subject requirement and that the ballot
124. See CoLO. CONsT. art. IV, § 1(2) (stating that the limitation applies to executive offices
beginning on or after Jan. 1, 1991); id art. V, § 3(2) (stating that the limitation applies to state
legislators beginning terms on or after Jan. 1, 1991); id art. XVIII, §9a(l) (stating that the limitation
applies to congressional representatives beginning terms on or after Jan. 1, 1991).
125. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (listing states that are considering term limitation
proposals).
126. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PErTION FoRM, Limited Political Terms in Certain
Elective Offices, April 3,1991 1hereinafterPtrloN].The amendment proposes to limit not only state
and congressional legislators, but also the lieutenant governor and Florida cabinet members. Id See
Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, at 226 (listing the offices which are affected by the eight consecutive
year limit).
127. See PMMON, supra note 126 (stating that the amendment takes effect on the date on
which it is approved by the electorate and that no prior service will count against the incumbent). See
also Advisory Opinion, supra note 8 at 226 (setting out the proposed amendment).
128. Compare PTIION, supra note 126 (proposing an eight-year consecutive term limitation)
with CoLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 9a(1) (imposing a 12 year consecutive term limitation).
129. Advisory Opinion, supra note 8, at 225. Under Florida law, the state Attorney General may
ask the Florida Supreme Court for an advisory opinion as to the constitutionality of proposed
legislation. FLA CONST. art IV, § 10; FLA. STAT. § 16.061 (1989).
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title and summary were valid. 131 In reaching this conclusion, the
court limited its inquiry to Florida law and found that the federal
constitutional issues raised by the opponents of the proposal were
not justiciable.' Two dissenting justices thought that the court
should have addressed whether state-enacted term limitations on
congressional representatives violated the United States
Constitution by adding a qualification for congressional office to
those already specified in article I of the United States
Constitution.132 However, the Florida Supreme Court is not the
only state supreme court that has declined to address the federal
constitutionality of term limitations on members of Congress.
1 33
In November 1991, voters in Washington state rejected a term
limitation proposal which would have limited the terms of both
state legislators and members of Congress."3  Under the
Washington proposal, members of the state house of representatives
would have been limited to three consecutive two-year terms and
a member of the state senate would have been limited to two
consecutive four-year terms. 135 If a legislator met the term limit
in one house, that person could still serve in the other house until
that legislator reached a total of ten years of total service in both
houses.'36 Furthermore, the Washington initiative would have
been retrospective in that a senator or representative who had
130. Advisory Opinion, supra note 8 at 228. The purpose of the single-subject requirement is
to prevent against multiple changes in the constitution with one initiative. See FLA. CONST. art. XI,
§ 3 (providing that any initiatives to amend the Florida constitution address only one subject). The
ballot title and summary are required to be in clear and unambiguous language. FLA. STAT. §
101.161(1) (stating ballot title requirements).
131. Advisory Opinion, supra note 8 at 228. The Florida court did not address whether the
proposed term limitations added a qualification to those already listed in the federal constitution. Id.
132. Id. at 229. The dissenters thought that term limitations added a qualification to those listed
in the federal constitution and were therefore invalid. Id. at 230-31.
133. See infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text (discussing the dismissal of a case brought
against d proposed term limitation amendment in Washington state).
134. Broom & Gilmore, Afraid of Losing Clout, Voters Reject Term Limits, Seattle Times, Nov.
6, 1991, at Al.
135. 1991 Washington Initiative 553, SECRETARY OF STATE, VOTERS PAMPHLErT, WASHINOTON -
STATE GENERAL ELECTION at 24 (Nov. 5, 1991). According to the proposal, terms would be
consecutive unless they were six years apart. Id
136. Id.
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served the maximum number of terms would have been able to
serve only one more term after enactment of the initiative.'37
The proposed term limitation provision applicable to
Washington's members of Congress was nearly identical to that
affecting state legislators.138  Members of the House of
Representatives would have been limited to three consecutive
terms, and members of the Senate would have been limited to two
consecutive terms.'39 However, instead of the ten-year limit on
serving as both representative and senator, as imposed on state
legislators, the state's members of Congress would have been
limited to twelve consecutive years in any combination of
service." Finally, the Washington provision was also
retrospective, since congressional representatives who had served
the maximum number of terms at the time of the proposed
enactment could have served only one more term. 141
Before the measure was placed on the ballot, the Washington
Supreme Court dismissed a challenge to the proposal's
constitutionality under the state constitution in League of Women
Voters v. Munro.'42 The Washington court declined to rule on
any state or federal constitutional issues, noting that the issues were
complex, of public importance, and should not be decided in a
cursory manner.143 As a result, the court's opinion constituted a
mere two page order dismissing the case.1"
Although state-enacted term limitations on state legislators have
faced a number of constitutional challenges, as the above
discussion of Washington, Florida, and California indicates, term
limitations have been regularly upheld by the courts. The argument
that term limitation provisions are constitutional was reinforced
when, on March 9, 1992, the United States Supreme Court declined
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v. Eu, which upheld the constitutionality of term limitations on
both state and federal grounds."as Since the status of state-enacted
term limitations on members of Congress has yet to be
decided," the remainder of this Comment will discuss the
constitutionality of state-enacted term limitations on members of
Congress.
EI. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
ON TERM LIMITATION
Despite the recent acceptance of state-enacted term limitations
on state elected legislators, state term limitations on congressional
representatives may pose different problems. Several unique federal
constitutional arguments can be raised against state-enacted
congressional term limitations. The first, and most probable,
argument is that state constitutional amendments imposing a term
limitation requirement on congressional representatives expressly
conflict with the federal constitutional qualifications for those
offices. 47 A second argument, which was rejected by the
California Supreme Court in Eu in the context of term limitations
on state legislators, is that term limitations may deprive both
candidates and voters of their rights under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 14' A third argument, also
145. 54 Cal. 3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309,286 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1292
(1992).
146. See Glasser, Term Limit Drive Makes Comeback, Roll Call, Mar. 12, 1992 (stating that
the courts will have to decide the federal term limit question solely on the issue of whether states can
control the qualifications for members of national legislature).
147. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cL 2 (stating "No person shall be a Representative who shall
not have attained to the Age of Twenty Five Years, and been Seven Years a Citizen of the United
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen");
id. art. 1, § 3, cl. 3 (stating "No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of
thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected,
be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.")
148. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 (equal protection clause); Legislature v. Eu, 54
Cal. 3d 492, 514-25, 816 P.2d 1309, 1322-29, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283, 296-303 (1991) (discussing and
rejecting the argument that term limitations which constitute a lifetime ban on holding office violate
the first and fourteenth amendments).
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rejected by the California Supreme Court in Eu, 149 is that term
limitations impermissibly burden the rights of freedom of speech
of candidates and the freedom of association of voters under the
first amendment.15 ° The next section will discuss each of these
arguments in turn.
Before considering these arguments, however, a notable aspect
of term limitation analysis must be recognized. In general, two
types of term limitations on members of Congress have either been
proposed or enacted. The first type, as enacted in Colorado,
imposes a limit on the consecutive number of terms a member of
Congress may serve.151 Consecutive limits allow a member of
Congress to later run for the same office if that person waits a
specified number of years between terms. 152 The second type, as
proposed in Florida,'53 imposes a lifetime ban from a particular
office after the specified number of terms has been served. 154 The
lifetime ban approach would forever bar a member of Congress
149. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d. at 515, 816 P.2d at 1322,286 Cal. Rptr. at 296. The court dismissed the
argument that a "'compelling interest" standard was required to test the validity of term limitations
because of the impact on first amendment rights by stating that term limitations have no effect on
speech interests and affect all political parties equally. Id The court compared term limitations with
a California law which was struck down by the United States Supreme Court in Eu v. San Francisco
Democratic Committee, 489 U.S. 214, 222. (1991) That California law had prohibited primary
endorsements by political parties. Id In Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Committee, the "compelling
interest" standard was employed because of the serious impact on first amendment rights in that case.
Id
150. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the California Supreme Court at 12, Legislature v.
Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1991), cer. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1292 (1992)
(arguing that Proposition 140 impermissibly restricts political speech and activity). The petition for
a writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court on March 9, 1992. Legislature
v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283, cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1292 (1992).
151. See CoLO. CoNST. art. V, § 3(2) (imposing consecutive term limitations on state's
congressional representatives).
152. Id. See supra note 115-122 and accompanying text (discussing Colorado's term limitation
amendment which bans legislators from consecutive terms).
153. See supra notes 126-128 and accompanying text (discussing Florida's proposed
amendment).
154. PE ooN, supra note 122. This is also the type of limitation which was defeated in the
state ofWashington. See supra notes 134-144 and accompanying text (discussing Washington's failed
term limitation proposal).
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from serving in the same congressional office if that member has
served the maximum number of terms allowed. 5 '
The implications of these different approaches to term
limitation are irrelevant to the analysis under the qualifications
clauses, because, in either case, term limitations add a qualification
to those already prescribed in article I of the United States
Constitution. 156 While some commentators have argued that term
limitations which constitute a lifetime ban on holding office after
serving the maximum number of terms are more likely to violate
the equal protection clause,15 7 this prediction may be unlikely in
light of the California Supreme Court's disposition of Legislature
v. Eu. 5 8  Finally, different results may also occur under first
amendment analysis. However, again because of the disposition in
the Eu case, these differences may not be significant in determining
the validity of term limitations.'5 9
155. See PEThION, supra note 126 (stating that no person can run for the same office if that
person has served for eight consecutive years).
156. See infra notes 160-231 and accompanying text (discussing the qualifications clauses).
157. See, e.g., Note, Recent Developments in the Law, 28 HARv. L ON LEoIs. 569,589 (1990)
[hereinafter Note] (stating that term limit laws which constitute a permanent ban on service in the
legislature raise more difficult constitutional questions than term limits which ban consecutive service
in office, as in Colorado).
158. See Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 515, 816 P.2d at 1324, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 296 (1991) (holding that
California's term limitations did not volate the equal protection clause). This is especially true since
the California court stated it was following the same analysis for the equal protection and first
amendment issues that the United States Supreme Court would use. Id. at 515, 816 P.2d at 1322, 286
Cal. Rptr. at 296. While it has no precedential value, the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari may
indicate that the California court's analysis is accurate in light of the federal constitution. Legislature
v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d. 492, 816 P.2d 1309, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1991), cemt denied, 112 S. Ct. 1292
(1992).
159. See Eu at 515, 816 P.2d at 1322, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 296 (holding term limitations valid
under first amendment, equal protection, and bill of attainder challenges). A lifetime ban term
limitation, which petitioners in Eu argued that Proposition 140 imposed, is more stringent than a ban
on consecutive terms since it forever bans the candidate from a particular office. Id at 506, 816 P.2d
at 1316, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283, 290. Intuitively, if the more stringent lifetime ban type has been upheld,
the less stringent consective ban type would also be upheld.
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A. Qualifications Clauses
The qualifications clauses of the United States Constitution set
out specific eligibility requirements for members of Congress."
Although the qualifications for representatives and senators vary
slightly, the requirements for both offices include age, citizenship,
and residency qualifications.161 Term limitations, either in the
form of consecutive limits or lifetime bans, are not included among
the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution. Therefore, it is
argued that term limitations enacted by the states"6 2 on federal
legislators impose an additional qualification for office, since these
limitations require that a candidate cannot be an incumbent who
has served the maximum number of terms.
Writing in The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton considered the
requirements for congressional office listed in the constitution to be
exclusive.163 Hamilton wrote that the qualifications of both
electors and members of Congress, "as has been remarked upon
other occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are
unalterable by the legislature."1 ' This position has been
160. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (setting out qualifications for representatives); hi art. 1, § 3,
cl. 3 (setting out qualifications for senators).
161. Id. art. , § 2, cL 2; id. arL I, § 2, cl. 3. Clause 2 pertains to representatives and states,
"No person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years,
and been Seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an
Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen." Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. Clause 3 contains the
requirements for senators and states, "No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to
the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when
elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen." Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
162. In general, states laws governing elections are given deference under the federal
constitution. The United States Constitution, article I, section 4, clause 1 provides in part: "The
Tunes, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed
in each State by the Legislature thereof ......
Id. See Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 515,816 P.2d at 1323,286 Cal. Rptr. at 297 (quoting Rodriguez v. Popular
Democratic Party, 451 U.S. 1 (1982)). Under their article I powers, states have been allowed to
restrict candidates' access to the ballot, but any restrictions states enact must comply with the United
States constitution. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142 (1972). The only way to enact a state law
provision which conflicts with the Constitution is through an amendment to the federal constitution
under article V. U.S. CONST. art. V. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522 (1969) (stating
that the qualifications in the constitution were to establish requirements for office and could be
altered only by a constitutional amendment).
163. Ti FEDRAUsT No. 60, at 394 (A. Hamilton) (E. M. Earle ed. 1937).
164. Id.
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endorsed by the United States Supreme Court, and followed by
federal and state courts."
In addition to the expressed intent of the Founding Fathers, the
United States Supreme Court has also considered the extent of the
exclusivity of the qualifications clauses. In Powell v.
McCormack," the Supreme Court examined the qualifications
for service in Congress as set out in the Constitution.'67 The
House of Representatives had refused to seat Powell, alleging that
he had committed several unethical acts.168 The Supreme Court
held that the House could not exclude Powell, a duty elected
member of Congress, for any reason other than the qualifications
set forth in the Constitution.169 The case centered on the authority
of the House to exclude Powell under article I, section 5 of the
Constitution which provides that the House shall be the judge of
the qualifications of its members. 7 '
Powell argued that it was the intention of the framers of the
constitution that the qualifications in the constitution could not be
165. See infra notes 166-231 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme Court
and lower federal court decisions which analyze the qualifications clauses). State courts have held
that "resign to run," and other state-enacted requirements to run for congressional office violate the
qualifications clause. See Lowe v. Fowler, 240 Ga. 213, 240 S.E.2d 70 (1977) (resign to run
provision); State ex rel. Chavez v. Evans, 79 N.M. 578,446 P.2d 445 (1968) (residency and qualified
elector provision); Hellman v. Collier, 217 Md. 93, 141 A.2d 908, 911 (1958) (residency
requirement); Danielson v. Fitzsimmons, 232 Minn. 149,44 N.W.2d 484 (1950) (excluded convicted
felons); Riley v. Cordeli, 200 Okla. 390, 194 P.2d 857 (1948) (excluded judges during term of
office); Buckingham v. State, 42 Del. 405, 35 A.2d 903 (1944) (excluded judges during term of
office); Stockton v. McFarland, 56 Ariz. 138, 106 P.2d 328 (1940) (excluded judges during term of
office); In re O'Connor, 173 Misc. 419, 17 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1940) (rejected ballot position because he
was an avowed communist); Ekwall v. Stadelman, 146 Or. 439, 30 P.2d 1037 (1934) (excluded
judges during term of office); State ex rel. Chandler v. Howell, 104 Wash. 99, 175 P. 569 (1918)
(excluded judges during term of office). See also State v. Crane, 65 Wyo. 189, 197 P.2d 364 (1948)
(holding, after an extensive historical discussion, that a state constitutional provision which did not
allow the governor to seek another office during the governor's term was unconstitutional under the
qualifications clause).
166. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
167. Id. at 549.
168. Id Powell allegedly deceived the House as to travel expenses and illegal payments to his
wife. Id.
169. 1& at 550.
170. Id. at 507. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. I (stating "-[e]ach house shall be the judge of
the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members").
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changed by Congress.17 In resolving this issue, the Supreme
Court in Powell surveyed the history of the constitutional
requirements for office." 2 The Court agreed with Powell that, as
reflected in the constitutional debates and the events surrounding
them, the qualifications in the constitution are exclusive.17 3 In so
holding, the Powell Court referred to statements by Alexander
Hamilton and James Madison during the constitutional debates.
174
Hamilton had stated that a fundamental principle of our
representative democracy is "that the people should choose whom
they please to govern them,"' 75 and Madison had stated that
"this principle is undermined as much by limiting whom the
people can select as by limiting the franchise itself. ' 176 These
statements, according to the Powell Court, were the principal
reasons that the Constitutional Convention had granted Congress
only a limited power to expel members.1 7
While the Court's holding in Powell referred to the ability of
the House to exclude a member under the constitution, the
exclusivity of the qualifications set out in the constitution was
emphasized by the Court throughout the opinion.17 1 The Powell
Court's endorsement of Hamilton's view of the exclusivity of the
qualifications set out in the constitution seems to foreclose the
argument that these qualifications can be supplemented by term
limitations. This historical view, endorsed by the Supreme Court is
especially useful where there are no direct precedents regarding the
application of the qualifications clauses to term limitations on
members of Congress. Therefore, state-enacted term limitations on
members of Congress, under the historical reasoning of Powell,
violate the qualifications clauses of the constitution by adding to
171. PoweU, 395 U.S. at 532.
172. Id. at 522-47.
173. Id. at 532.
174. i at 547.
175. Id (quoting 2 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 257) (J. Elliot ed. 1836)
(statement of A. Hamilton).
176. Id. (quoting 2 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 254) (J. Elliot ed. 1836)
(statement of J. Madison).
177. Id
178. Powell, 395 U.S. 486, 538-47.
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the requirements for congressional office set out in the constitution,
contrary to the "defied and fixed" qualifications contemplated by
the framers.
179
One year after Powell, Justice Black, sitting in his role as a
circuit justice, examined whether a state law provision, which
required state officers to resign in order to run for the United States
House of Representatives, violated the qualifications clause. 80 In
Davis, Justice Black wrote an opinion supporting an order to stay
the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court which had upheld the
Florida Secretary of State's denial of a ballot position to the
plaintiffs. 8 ' The plaintiffs, a sheriff and a city mayor, wanted to
run for the United States House of Representatives. 182 A Florida
statute required incumbents of state elected office to resign in order
to run for another office, including Congress. 18 3 This "resign to
run" statute, upheld in Davis by the Florida Supreme Court, was
later invalidated in a different case by a federal district court as
conflicting with the qualifications clause.8 4 While Justice Black's
decision was based on the prudential consideration that more harm
would be done to the candidates if their names were excluded than
would be done to the state of Florida, Justice Black did predict that
the full Supreme Court, if presented with this issue, would find that
this resign to run provision added a qualification for congressional
office to those set out in the constitution and, therefore, that it was
unconstitutional. 
8 5
Like the resign to run provision in Davis, term limitations
restrict a candidate's right to run for office. In fact, it might be
argued that term limitations restrict that right even further, because
179. See supra, note 163 and accompanying text (discussing Hamilton's view of the
qualifications in the Constitution as unalterable).
180. Davis v. Adams, 400 U.S. 1203 (1970).
181. Id.
182. Id at 1203. The other plaintiff was James J. Ward, Jr., the mayor of Plantation, Florida.
IM
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1203. See State ex tel. Davis v. Adams, 238 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1970), arid on
rehearing, 238 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1970); Stack v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. 1295 (N.D. Fla. 1970)
(decision of federal district court).
185. Davis, 400 U.S. at 1204.
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the criteria for exclusion, incumbency in that particular office, is an
immutable characteristic of the candidate. The plaintiffs in Davis
could have resigned their state offices in order to run for the House
of Representatives, but an incumbent, subject to a lifetime ban term
limitation, cannot change status with a resignation. Even if a term
limitation imposes a consecutive ban, an incumbent cannot change
status in order to run for office in the same year, as could the
plaintiffs in Davis.
Another case where the Supreme Court examined the
qualifications clauses, albeit in a cursory manner, was Storer v.
Brown.1 16  In that case, a California statute prohibited an
independent candidate from appearing on the ballot if that person
had either voted in the immediately preceding primary, or had been
registered with another political party in the year preceding the last
primary election."8 7 The plaintiff, Storer, was registered as a
Democrat until January of 1972, and was, therefore, disqualified
from running as an independent candidate for United States
Representative in 1972 under the California affiliation
provision."18
In a footnote, the Storer Court found that the provision
requiring non-affiliation in the year preceding the last primary
election did not add a qualification for membership in the House
of Representatives under article I of the United States
Constitution. 9 In fact, the Court in Storer noted that there was
no basis for the contention that the affiliation statute imposed an
additional qualification since the affiliation requirement was similar
to requiring a candidate to win a primary in order to secure
186. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
187. Storer, 415 U.S. at 726-27. The statute at issue in Storer was CAL. E.EC. CODE § 683
O(c),(d) (West 1974). The same statute also required independent candidates to file nominating papers
signed by no more than six, but no less than five percent of the entire votes cast in preceding general
election in the area where the candidate sought to run. Id. These signatures had to be obtained in a
24-hour period. Id. Additionally, the voters who signed the petition could not have voted in the last
primary. Id These provisions were not attacked as adding a qualification to congressional office. Id
188. Id. at 727-28. Another plaintiff, Fromhagen, was also registered as a Democrat until early
in 1972, and was similarly disqualified from appearing as an independent candidate by California
Elections Code section 6830(d). Storer, 415 U.S. at 727. Storer will refer to both plaintiffs.
189. Id. at 746 n.16.
1704
1992 / Constitutionality of Term Limitations
placement on the ballot.1'9 Consequently, according to the Storer
court, the affiliation requirement was a permissible candidacy
requirement for demonstrating substantial support within the
community.191 Instead, the Court found that the subject provision
violated the equal protection clause, as it conditioned obtaining a
ballot position on joining a new political party." The Storer
Court determined that a person need not follow the route of
belonging to a political party to appear on the ballot in a general
election.193
Term limitations are distinguishable from the California
affiliation provision in Storer. The policies of term limitation and
the policies of the affiliation provisions are quite different. 194 The
considerations of the Court which were determinative in Storer,
such as preserving the integrity of avenues to the ballot, avoiding
voter confusion, and assuring that the winner is the choice of the
majority, are policies which do not apply to term limitation.1 95
Unlike the independent candidates in Storer, the incunbent
candidate has demonstrated a level of public support, the very fact
that California wanted to ascertain with its statute.' 96 Therefore,
while the affiliation requirement does not add to the qualifications
of the constitution since it is only related to public support, a term
limitation requirement changes the requirements of office, an office
for which the incumbent is otherwise qualified to become a
candidate.
Federal district courts and courts of appeal have also considered
the extent of the exclusivity of the qualifications clauses of the
190. Id. at 746, n.16. See Williams v. Tucker, 382 F.Supp. 381 (1974) (holding that a
Pennsylvania statute, which prevented a candidate for Congress from filing nomination papers and
running in a primary at the same time, did not add a qualification to those listed in the constitution,
as but instead regulated the "times, places and manner of holding elections for senators" as expressly
granted to the states by article I, section 4, clause I of the Constitution).
191. Storer, 415 U.S. at 746 n.16.
192. ld. at 746.
193. Id. at 774-75.
194. See generally Note, supra note 157, at 600-07 (outlining the policies behind term
limitation amendments).
195. Storer, 415 U.S. at 732-33 (quoting Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431,442 (1971); Bullock
v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972)).
196. Storer, 415 U.S. at 733.
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United States Constitution.197 Many of these courts have held, as
did the United States Supreme Court in Powell, that certain
provisions which restrict a person's candidacy for Congress add to
the qualifications prescribed in the constitution and are therefore
invalid. 98 For example, in Dillon v. Fiorina,1' a New Mexico
statute imposing a residency requirement on candidates for the
office of United States Senator was invalidated as conflicting with
the qualifications clauses of the Constitution.2"
When confronted with resign to run provisions, lower federal
courts, similar to Justice Black's analysis in Davis, have held that
such provisions add to the qualifications for Congress set out in the
Constitution."' In Stack v. Adams,2°2 a Florida statute required
a person who wished to be a candidate for the United States House
of Representatives to resign from any state office currently
held.2 °3 The district court ruled that this requirement violated the
constitution by adding a qualification to the office of United States
Representative in violation of the qualifications clauses.2°  The
Stack court, citing Powell, held that state laws cannot add to or
197. See infra notes 199-224 and accompanying text (discussing analysis under the
qualifications clauses in federal courts).
198. See Exon v. Tiemn nn, 279 F. Supp. 609 (D. Neb. 1968) (district residency requirements);
Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F. Supp. 729 (D. N.M. 1972) (residency requirement); Stack v. Adams, 315
F. Supp. 1295 (N.D. Fla. 1970) (resign to run provision). Cf. Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d 1523 (9th
Cir. 1983) (resign to run provision); Williams v. Tucker, 382 F.Supp. 381 (M.D. Penn. 1974)
(signature requirement); Signorelli v. Evans, 637 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1980) (resign to run provision
held to add a qualification, but allowed under incompatibility clause of the United States
Constitution). See supra notes 166-179 and accompanying text (discussing Powel).
199. 340 F.Supp. 729 (D. N.M. 1972).
200. Id at 731. The court stated that it is well-settled that a state cannot add to or subtract from
the qualifications set forth in the constitution. Id See Exon v. Tiemann, 279 F. Supp. 609, 613 (D.
Neb. 1968) (striking down district residency requirements on the basis that states cannot add to the
qualifications for representative set out in the constitution).
201. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (noting lower federal court opinions which
found that resign to run provisions added a qualification to those set forth in the constitution).
202. 315 F. Supp. 1295 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
203. Id. at 1295.
204. Id. at 1297. See State ex rel. Davis v. Adams, 238 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1970) (opinion by the
Florida Supreme Court agreeing with the analysis in Stack v. Adams that resign to run provisions add
a qualification to those set out in the constitution).
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subtract from the requirements for congressional office listed in the
United States Constitution. 5
In direct contrast to Davis and Stack is the holding in Signorelli
v. Evans.206 In that case, the Second Circuit upheld a resign to
run statute against a constitutional attack alleging that it added a
qualification for congressional office.2"7 The New York statute
provided that a judge had to resign from judicial office in order to
run for Congress.2"8 In its discussion, the Signorelli court referred
to the idea, announced in Powell, that the election of members of
Congress is the choice of the people.2 9 With this principle in
mind, the Signorelli court reasoned that a prohibition on candidacy
during a term of office would prevent that candidate from
appearing on the ballot and would, therefore, be invalid as adding
a qualification.210 The Signorelli court stated that the New York
statute imposed a lesser burden on candidates than state laws which
absolutely prohibited judges from becoming a Congressional
candidate during the judicial terms for which they had been
elected.211 These absolute prohibition types of state statutes, the
SignorelIi court recognized, are invalid under the qualifications
clauses.21 In contrast, the New York statute allowed the
candidate to run for Congress, if the candidate was willing to
resign the judgeship upon announcing his candidacy.213 The
Signorelli court believed this was a more indirect form of
regulation than the invalid absolute prohibition type of state
laws.
214
The Signorelli court noted that even New York's indirect
regulation added a qualification to those set forth in the
constitution, because, in addition to being over 25, an inhabitant of
205. Stack, 315 F. Supp. at 1297.
206. 637 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1980).
207. Id. at 863.
208. Id. at 854-55.
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New York and a citizen for seven years, the candidate could not be
a state judge.215 Finding that the resign to run provision added
a qualification, the court nevertheless held that the provision was
valid based upon an analogy to the incompatibility clause of the
constitution.216 The basic principle of incompatibility is that no
person should hold any federal office concurrent with being a
member of Congress.2 7  The court noted that because New
York's statute was aimed at the judicial office, a subject for local
government, and not at the candidate himself, New York could
constitutionally enact this statute.2 8 The court based its decision
on the fact that because the New York statute was aimed at an area
within state's traditional authority, it was not invalid because of its
indirect effect on the qualifications for congressional office.21 9
Ultimately, the court held that New York could require state
judges to resign before becoming candidates for congress, even
though the statute added an "indirect" qualification to those in the
constitution, since the predicate for doing so, the incompatibility
clause, was found in the federal constitution." In requiring a
judge to first resign from judicial office before becoming a
congressional candidate, the court recognized that the statute
imposed an additional qualification on congressional candidacy, but
said that New York, in essence, was adopting its own
incompatibility clause."
Term limitations are easily distinguishable from the New York
resign to run provision upheld in Signorelli. First, the New York
215. Id.
216. Id. at 863. The incompatibility clause states that "Nlo person holding any Office under
the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.'" U.S. CONST.
art. , § 6, cl. 2.
217. Signorelli, 637 F.2d at 860. As the Signorell court noted, this broad principle was refined
to restrict members of congress only during their elected terms of office. Id. at 861.
218. Id. at 859.
219. Id The court analogized this statute to the situation where states restrict the occupational
opportunities of convicted felons. Id. These restrictions, the court noted, indirectly add a penalty to
the offense, but have been sustained against challenges that such laws violate the ex post facto clause
of the constitution, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1. Id.
220. Id at 863.
221. Id at 861.
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statute applied to state officers, namely, state judges.' Term
limitations, like those enacted in Colorado, limit members of
Congress, which are federal officers.223 Second, the Signorelli
court found that New York was justified in enacting the provision
because it had a parallel in the incompatibility clause of the United
States Constitution and, therefore, even though it imposed an
"indirect" qualification on congressional office, the statute was
valid.224 By contrast, there is no constitutional parallel for term
limitations. As a result, term limitations add an unprecedented
qualification on candidacy for congressional office in violation of
the qualifications clauses.
It has been argued that term limitations do not add to the
qualifications in the United States Constitution.' This argument
is that term limitations are a very narrow type of restriction, since
they affect only incumbent officeholders, and do not prevent the
incumbent from running for another office."2 However, even if
term limitations are so limited, the United States Supreme Court
has recognized that the qualifications in the constitution are
exclusive. 7 Therefore, the exclusive nature of the qualifications
clauses preclude any argument that these can be added to, even if
the addition is in fact a limited one.' Signorelli, because of its
emphasis on the fact that judges are state officers, cannot serve as
a precedent for state laws which add a qualification to federal
officers.
From the time of the Founding Fathers, the qualifications
clauses in the United States Constitution have been considered to
be the exclusive statements of the qualifications for membership in
the United States House of Representatives and Senate.229
222. Id. at 856.
223. COLO. CONST. art. XIX, § 9a(1).
224. Signoreli, 637 F.2d at 861-63.
225. Mellor, Term Limits Are Consdtutiona, Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1991, at A22.
226. Id.
227. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 532 (1969).
228. See supra notes 160-165 (discussing the qualifications clauses and their historical
background). See also Stack v. Adams, supra notes 204-205 (invalidating a resign to run provision
as conflicting with the qualifications clauses).
229. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 532 (1969).
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Although an "indirect" additional qualification for congressional
office, predicated upon a parallel constitutional section, has
survived judicial scrutiny, the qualifications clauses have been
consistently interpreted as exclusive of any other requirements for
office." As a result of this strict interpretation of the
qualifications clauses, it appears that state-enacted term limitations
on congressional representatives constitute an additional
qualification on congressional membership, and violate the
qualifications clauses.
B. Equal Protection
Another common argument against the validity of term
limitations is that term limitations violate the equal protection
clause of the United States Constitution. 2  Found in the
fourteenth amendment, the equal protection clause guarantees all
persons equal protection under the laws of the states.233 Based on
this clause, the argument is made that term limitations deprive
incumbent candidates of a right to hold public office because term
limitations affect the right of incumbents, as opposed to non-
230. Signorelli v. Evans, 637 F.2d 853, 863 (1980).
231. Powell, 395 U.S. at 532; Davis v. Adams, 400 U.S. 1203,1203 (1970); Exon v. Tiemann,
279 F. Supp. 609, 613 (1. Neb. 1968); Stack v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. 1295 (N.D. Fla. 1970); Dillon
v. Fiorina, 340 F. Supp. 729, 731 (1). N.M. 1972).
232. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I, cl. 2 (stating that "No state shall.., deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"). The fourteenth amendment was
ratified on July 19, 1868. JAMES, THE RATCAION OF THE FouRTEENM AMENDMENT 22 (1984).
See MEYER, Tim HISTORY AND MEANINo OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 3-5 (1977) [hereinafter
MER] (discussing ratification of the fourteenth amendment by Congress and the states). This
amendment was originally enacted to protect newly freed slaves from discrimination. JAMES, at 303-
04 (discussing the purposes of the southern and northern states in passing the fourteenth amendment).
See also MEYER at 107-111 (discussing the reasons for the fourteenth amendment); BAER, EQUALrIY
UNDER THE CONSTIrLON 57 (1983) (discussing the objectives of the fourteenth amendment).
However, since its ratification, the equal protection clause has been applied in many different
contexts. See generally MEYER at 204-263 (citing cases which used the fourteenth amendment to
examine classifications other than race); BAER at 87 (discussing early applications of equal protection
other than race, including gender). Cf. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134,141 (1974) (stating that ballot
access restrictions must comply with the requirements of the equal protection clause).
233. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 (equal protection clause).
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incumbents, to run for office, and the right of voters to vote for an
incumbent.
234
When applying the equal protection clause, courts traditionally
first examine the interests involved and then, based on the type of
interest found, employ one of three levels of analysis: strict
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review.235 In
general, only if a fundamental right or a suspect class is involved,
will the courts utilize strict scrutiny.236 The traditional inquiry is
whether the state action infringes on a fundamental right or creates
classifications which discriminate against similarly situated
persons.237 However, in cases involving regulations restricting
ballot access, the United States Supreme Court has developed a
different analysis which includes a balancing test that does not
follow traditional equal protection analysis.
238
In Clements v. Fashing,3 a plurality of the Court, using the
traditional equal protection analysis, relied on an earlier ballot
234. See Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492,514,816 P.2d 1309, 1322,286 Cal. Rptr. 283,296
(1991) (stating petitioners' argument that California's term limitation amendment infringes on a
fundamental right to hold office).
235. See, eg., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1966) (applying strict scrutiny to a statute
which discriminated on the basis of race); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to a regulation based on gender); Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106,
110 (1948) (applying rational basis test to an economic regulation).
236. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. Seegenerally, Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Modelfor Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 8 (1972) (stating
that strict scrutiny is usually fatal when applied to test the validity of state laws which are challenged
under the equal protection clause); Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,
69 HARv. L REv. 1 (1955) (discussing the school segregation cases); Rostow, The Japanese-
American Cases: A Disaster, 54 YALE L J. 489 (1945) (discussing the Japanese internment cases and
the application of strict scrutiny).
237. Railway Express, 336 U.S. at 110; Loving, 388 U.S. at 10. See generally, Dworkin, Social
Sciences and Constitutional Rights: The Consequences of Uncertainty, 6 J. LAW AND EDUC. 3 10-11
(1977) (discussing the differences between equality of treatment and treatment as an equal); Karst,
Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977)
(discussing the idea that laws which treat persons differently violate principles of equal citizenship).
238. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (applying a balancing test to a law
which infringed on voting and candidacy rights). See also J. NOWAK & R. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUnoNAL LAW 833 (1991) (stating that the Anderson balancing test is to be used in
examining cases which restrict candidates from appearing on the ballot). See generally Jardine, Ballot
Access Rights: The Constitutional Status of the Right to Run for Office, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 290
(1974) (discussing equal protection analysis of restrictions on office-holding before Anderson).
239. 457 U.S. 957 (1982).
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access case, Bullock v. Carter,2' to hold that candidacy is not a
fundamental right.241 Clements involved a challenge to two
provisions of the Texas constitution.242 The first provision,
section 19, required an officeholder to finish the current term of
office before running for the state legislature.2 43 The second
provision, section 65, provided that any officeholder who
announced candidacy for the legislature automatically forfeited any
office currently held.2' The Clements plurality noted that
traditional equal protection analysis, in cases involving restrictions
on appearing on the ballot, is a "matter of degree" which includes
considering the facts and circumstances behind the law, the state's
interest in restricting candidacy, and the interests which may be
burdened by the restrictions.245 Finding no fundamental right, the
plurality next examined whether the candidate's political
opportunity was burdened by the state's restriction to appearing on
the ballot.'u The plurality upheld section 19 because it imposed
only a waiting period on a candidate, which required only a
rational basis to survive application of the equal protection
clause.247 The plurality also upheld section 65 on the basis that
it imposed less substantial burdens than section 19, and involved
the same interests as section 19.248
A different approach from the Clements plurality analysis was
introduced the next year in Anderson v. Celebrezze.249 In
Anderson, the Court defined a balancing test to analyze restrictions
240. 405 U.S. 134 (1972). In examining a candidate filing fee provision under the equal
protection clause, the Bullock court stated that "the existence of barriers to a candidate's access to
the ballot 'does not of itself compel close scrutiny.' Id. at 143.
241. Clements, 457 U.S. at 963.
242. Id at 959.
243. Id at 960.
244. Id
245. Id at 963.
246. Id. at 964.
247. Id at 967-68. The plurality stated that because section 19 furthered Texas' interest in
maintaining the integrity of the Justices of the Peace, this provision, which would preclude a Justice
of the Peace from neglecting current duties to run a political campaign, was valid. Id The plurality
also thought the provision would protect the non-political nature of the judiciary branch. Id
248. Id at 970.
249. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
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on appearing on the ballot where those restrictions impair
constitutional rights." ° While the Supreme Court has not
explicitly endorsed this analysis, 51 it is the approach lower
federal and state courts have used in evaluating ballot access
restrictions.252
In Anderson, an Ohio statute required an independent candidate
for the office of President to register in March for the November
election.253  John Anderson, an independent candidate for
President, filed his application in April, missing the March
deadline."5 4 The Ohio Secretary of State refused to accept the late
application, prompting Anderson and three voters to challenge the
constitutionality of the Ohio filing statute.25 5 The Supreme Court
analyzed this claim in light of whether the statute unconstitutionally
burdened the voting and associational rights of Anderson's
supporters.256 The Court recognized that the statute directly
affected candidates, not voters,.57 but noted that the rights of
voters and candidates cannot be neatly separated.258 To evaluate
this statute under both the equal protection clause and the first
amendment, the Anderson Court employed the following test:
250. Id. at 789.
251. The Supreme Court has not applied the Anderson analysis subsequent to the Anderson
decision. In Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1991), the
California Supreme Court, before applying the Anderson test, noted that there was a lack of direction
by the high court in cases which restricted ballot access. Id. at 515, 816 P.2d at 1322, 286 Cal. Rptr.
at 296. Federal courts have also applied the Anderson test to examine restrictions on ballot access.
See, e.g., Matsumoto v. Puna, 775 F.2d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying the Anderson test in
examining a provision of a city charter which disqualified recalled city officials from election for two
years after their recall).
252. J. NOWAx & R. ROTUNDA, CONSmTrumoNAL LAw 833 (1991); Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal.
3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1991). But see Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d 1523 (9th
Cir. 1983) (examining a state resign to run provision using the Clements analysis); Zielasko v. Ohio,
693 F.Supp. 577 (N.D. Ohio 1988) (examining a law limiting the age of candidates for the judiciary
under the Clements equal protection analysis).
253. 460 U.S. 780,782 (1983). Members of the major political parties had to register in March
to compete in the June primary. Id. at 799.
254. Id at 782.
255. Id at 783.
256. Id. at 782.
257. Id at 786.
258. Id. at 786 (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972)).
1713
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
[A court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate
the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the
burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not
only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests; it
also must consider the extent to which those interests make is necessary
to burden the plaintiff's rights. Only after weighing all these factors is
the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged
provision is unconstitutional?, 59
Based upon this test, the Anderson Court found that the state's
asserted interests in voter education, 260 equal treatment of major
and minor party candidates, 261 and political stability262 were
outweighed by the interests of voters who associated to support
Anderson and his views.263
As the Court in Anderson noted, there are two groups whose
interests may be impaired by term limitation." ' One is the
candidate, who has an interest in running for office.265 The other
is the voter, who has an interest both in voting for the candidate
and in associating with other voters or with the candidate to
259. Id This was the approach used by the California Supreme Court in evaluating that state's
term limits on its state legislators and finding that a lifetime ban on service in the state legislature
did not violate the equal protection clause. Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 524, 816 P.2d 1309,
1328, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283, 296 (1991).
260. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 796. The state argued that it wished to have an informed and
educated electorate in advance of the election. Id. The Anderson Court did not find that seven months
was a necessary time period for voters to become informed of a Presidential candidate. Id. at 797-98.
261. Id. at 799. The state argued that because major party candidates had to file in March for
the June primaries, independents must file in June for the November election. Id. The Court found
that the effects on the candidates would be different, since even if the majority party candidate did
not file, that candidate's party would still be on the November ballot. Id.
262. Id. at 801. The state asserted that it had an interest in preventing the splintering in the
Republican party that Anderson's candidacy allegedly would cause. Id. The Anderson Court found
that the statute was not drawn to protect the major parties from "'intra-party feuding," because if it
was, it would be both overbroad and underinclusive. Id at 805.
263. Id. at 806.
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advance their collective political beliefs.2" In Anderson, the
Court found that the Ohio filing date, because it excluded
independents who had not filed early in the campaign, was a
burden on the independent candidate's right to run for president,
since such inflexibility was not imposed on the major political
party candidates.267 The Court also found that the Ohio filing
deadline burdened independents' signature-gathering efforts more
than the major political parties, since the major parties had a longer
time to comply with the requirements. 268 Furthermore, the Court
noted that these restrictions on the candidate also burdened voters
who support independent candidates, since the independent
candidates they support had to comply with shorter time
requirements than the major party candidates.2 ' The Anderson
Court noted that laws which unequally burden new or small
political parties, or independent candidates impinge on the voter's
associational rights guaranteed under the first amendment.27 The
Court held that the extent and nature of Ohio's filing deadline was
a significant burden the rights of both independent voters and
candidates and therefore, under the test it enunciated, was
invalid. 1
The continuing vitality of this analysis, and its applicability to
the constitutional analysis of term limitations was affirmed by the
California Supreme Court in Legislature v. Eu, where the
California court applied the Anderson analysis to evaluate the
impact of term limitations on the rights of voters and
candidates.272  As discussed earlier, the California court
determined that the state's interest in competitive, fair elections,
encouraging qualified persons to seek office, and eliminating unfair
Z66. Id. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (stating that voter's associational
rights under the frst amendment are implicated by laws which restrict a candidate's ability to appear
on the ballot).
267. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 792.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 792-93.
270. Id at 793.
271. Id. at 806.
272. 54 Cal. 3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1991). See supra notes 103-105 and
accompanying text (discussing application of the Anderson standard to term limitations).
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incumbent advantages273  outweighed the voters' rights in
reelecting an incumbent, and the incumbents' rights in running for
the same office.274 Term limitations for federal members of
congress have been predicated on the same or similar concerns as
limitations enacted for state congressional representatives.27
Therefore, the Eu equal protection analysis will likely apply to
state-enacted federal term limitations. While a state-enacted term
limitation amendment on members of Congress is probably valid
under the analysis applied in Eu,276 such limitations ultimately
fail under the qualifications clauses.
C. First Amendment
The first amendment protects the rights of freedom of religion,
speech, press, and peaceful assembly.2" The Supreme Court has
determined that political speech, voting, and assembly are protected
by the language of the first amendment.278 Opponents of term
limitation provisions commonly argue that term limitations violate
these first amendment interests associated with the freedom of
speech, such as the right to vote and the right of association.279
The right to vote, although not explicit in the first amendment,
has been interpreted to be a part of the protections of the first
273. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 519, 816 P.2d at 1325, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
274. Id. at 518, 816 P.2d at 1324,286 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
275. See CONSTITIONAL AMENDMENT PEITION FoRM, Limited Political Terms in Certain
Elective Offices, April 3,1991 (stating the purposes of limitations as preventing long-term incumbents
from becoming preoccupied with re-election, preventing incumbents from becoming beholden to
special interests, increasing voter participation, increasing citizen involvement in government and
increasing the number of persons who run for office).
276. 54 Cal. 3d 492, 518, 816 P.2d 1309, 1324,286 Cal. Rptr. 283,298 (1991).
277. See U.S. CONsT. amend I (ratified Dec. 15, 1791 and guaranteeing the freedoms of
religion, speech, press and assemblage).
278. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) (stating that political
speech is at the core of first amendment freedoms); id. at 14-15 (stating that the choices by citizens
of their representatives is essential); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958)
(stating that when individuals associate together, they can use their resources more effectively to
advocate their beliefs); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (stating that the right to associate
to advance political beliefs is fundamental).
279. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 515, 816 P.2d at 1322, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
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amendment."' Similarly, while there is no explicit right of
association found in the language of the first amendment, the
Supreme Court has found that a right of association exists in the
first amendment.28 Term limitation opponents have argued that
limitations infringe on first amendment rights by limiting political
speech and activity, by restricting the choice of persons who run
for office. 22 Term limitation opponents also argue that term
limitations infringe on the right to vote, because term limitations
prevent voters from choosing to vote for an incumbent
candidate.283 Most recently, these issues were litigated by the
California Supreme Court in Legislature v. Eu.
2s4
In prior cases examining the constitutionality of provisions
which restrict a candidate's appearance on the ballot, the first
amendment has been applied to cases which deny a candidate a
ballot position based upon refraining from certain types of
expression, or because the candidate represents a minority
party.285 For example, in Anderson, the Court considered whether
the law in that case burdened the availability of political
280. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15.
281. Williams, 393 U.S. at 30 (stating that the right to associate to advance political beliefs is
fundamental); Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208 (1986) (holding that Connecticut's primary,
which was closed to nonparty voters, violated the independent party's associational rights).
282. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the California Supreme Court at 12, Legislature v.
Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283, (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. CL 1292 (1992)
[hereinafter Brie] (citing Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) for the proposition
that the first amendment has its "fullest and most urgent" application to campaigns for political
office). Petitioners in Eu also relied on Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Committee, 489 U.S.
214 (1989), in which the Court struck down a law which banned political party endorsements in
primary elections, stating that ban implicated both the rights of speech and association. See generally
Note, supra note 157, at 590 (1991) (discussing first amendment implications of term limitation on
state legislators).
283. Brief, supra note 282, at 11 (arguing that voters are forever barred from voting for a
candidate of their choosing). See No'Er, supra note 157, at 590 (discussing first amendment rights).
284. 54 Cal. 3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309,286 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1991).
285. See EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OFREEDM O EXPRESSION 201 (1970) (stating that the frst
amendment is implicated in cases where a political party is entirely excluded from the ballot or where
individuals are required to meet qualifications or take oaths). See also CHAFPPE, FREE SPEECH IN THE
UNI=ED STATES 490-93 (1967) (discussing state laws which excluded communists from the ballot).
See generally Northrup, Local Nonpartisan Election, Poltical Parties and the First Amendment, 87
COLUM. L REv. 1677, 1684-93 (1987) (discussing the first amendment issues in state election laws).
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opportunity unfairly or unnecessarily."' On that issue, the
Supreme Court held that the Ohio filing deadline placed significant
state-imposed burdens on a national election process and was
therefore invalid."87 The California Supreme Court in Eu found
that California's term limitation amendment affected political
parties equally and did not invoke the right of freedom of speech
or association."' As with the equal protection arguments, the
disposition of Legislature v. Eu renders a subsequent challenge by
federal legislators likely to be unsuccessful. Although the first
amendment encompasses the right to vote and the right of
association, one court to this point has held that these rights are not
unconstitutionally impaired by term limitations.289
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
While term limitations are likely to be upheld against equal
protection or first amendment challenges, term limits on members
of Congress are probably invalid under the qualifications
clauses.29 Therefore, to enact term limitations on members of
Congress, a provision which conflicts expressly with the
qualifications clause, the federal constitution should be
amended.29' Article V of the federal constitution details the
286. 460 U.S. 780, 793 (1983). In particular, the Court referred to burdens on new or small
political parties and independent candidates, as having an impact on rust amendment freedoms. Id.
In fact, the Court pointed out that debate should be 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." Id. at 794
(quoting New York Tunes v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
287. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793.
288. Eu, 54 Cal. at 515, 816 P.2d at 1322, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 296. See supra notes 95-99 and
accompanying text (discussing the California court's disposition of the first amendment claim).
289. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 515, 816 P.2d at 1322,286 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
290. See supra notes 160-231 (analyzing term limitations on members of Congress under the
qualifications clauses).
291. See supra notes 230-231 and accompanying text (discussing the invalidity of state enacted
term limitations on members of congress under the qualifications clauses). See also, U.S. CONST'. art.
V (setting out the procedures for amending the constitution). See generally, Ervin, Proposed
Legislation to Implement the Convention Method of Amending the Constitution, 66 Micil. L REv.
875, 895 (1968) (stating that if part of Article V, a provision of the constitution, is not valid, it
should be stricken by the amendment process).
1718
1992 / Constitutionality of Term Limitations
procedure for amending the Constitution.2" There are two routes
a constitutional amendment may take. First, if two-thirds of both
houses of Congress approve, a constitutional amendment proposed
by Congress is sent to the states for ratification. 293 The state
procedures generally follow those of the federal constitution,
however, many states have developed their own procedures.294
The second method is where two-thirds of the state legislatures
apply to Congress to convene a constitutional convention.29 5 After
the convention has been convened, three-fourths of the state
legislatures must approve the amendment for it to become part of
the federal constitution. 2' This process puts an onerous burden
on proponents of term limitation,297  however, it is not an
impossible idea, since the number of terms of the president was
limited by an amendment to the constitution.
298
While Congress is attempting to limit its terms through a
constitutional amendment,299  given the history of such
proposals,3' such an amendment will have to come from the
states. Although term limitation is popular, over thirty-three states
will have to apply to convene a constitutional convention, and
292. U.S. CoNsr. art V. Article V provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose
Amendments to this Constitution, or, on Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of
the several states, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments which ... shall be
valid... when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by
Conventions in three fourths thereof ....
Id.
293. Bonfield, The Dirksen Amendment and the Article V Convention Process, 66 MIcH. L.
REV. 949, 950 (1968).
294. EDEL, A CONS1ITUT/ONAL CONVENTION 49-52 (1981).
295. Bonfield, supra note 294, at 951-52.
296. U.S. CONST. art. V.
297. See Carson, Disadvantages of a Federal Constitutional Convention, 66 MIcH. L. J. 921,
925 (1968) (stating that futile conflict and the pressures of a constitutional convention will create an
atmosphere which is not conducive to calm deliberation); EDEL, A CoNsTrroNAL CONVENTION
12 (1981) (discussing the difficulties of a constitutional convention); VosE, CoNsTrmmoNAL
CHANom AMENDMENT Poimcs AN SUPREmE COURT PRACTICES SINCE 1900 371 (1972) (stating
constitutional amendment practices are uneven, uncertain, and fickle).
298. See U.S. CONS?. amend XXII (limiting the President of the United States to two terms of
office).
299. See supra notes 34-56 and accompanying text (discussing past and current congressional
attempts to limit terms).
300. Id.
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agree upon a constitutional amendment."' After approval of those
states, the agreed upon amendment will have to be passed by over
37 states." 2
V. CONCLUSION
Although term limitations were not mentioned in the history of
the United States Constitution, they enjoy current popularity. The
number of states considering constitutional amendments is growing.
While state-enacted term limitations on state legislators are
constitutional, the constitutionality of state-enacted limitations on
members of Congress has not been addressed by any court. Such
limitations are invalid under the qualifications clauses. A
constitutional amendment, while a difficult method of enacting a
law, is the only constitutional method by which states can impose
term limitations on federal legislators.
Tiffanie Kovacevich
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301. U.S. CONST. art. V. See Bonfield, supra note 294, at 951-976 (detailing the procedure of
a constitutional convention). See also CAPLAN, CONSTniuTIONAL BRINKSMANSHIP 93-114 (1988)
(discussing constitutional convention procedure).
302. L
